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modified
!next_token_talloc(ctx, &cmd_ptr,&buf2,NULL)) {
d_printf("symlink <oldname> <newname>\n");
return 1;
}
oldname = talloc_asprintf(ctx,
"%s", // << HERE modified
buf);
if (!oldname) {
return 1;
}
newname = talloc_asprintf(ctx,
gain access to the victim's SMB service.
Finally, after successful exploitation, the module will create the
file 'owned.txt' in the ADMIN$ share (c:\windows) with the following
text: "Windows SMB NTLM Authentication weak nonce vulnerability
successfully exploited!".
This module can be easily modified to execute code on the remote
system (given the target user has enough privileges).
To exploit the vulnerability repeat the following steps:
1. copy msf_smb_weak_nonce.rb to
29 au BufNewFile,BufRead ?\+.in
30 \ if expand("<afile>:t") != "configure.in" |
*31 \ exe "doau filetypedetect BufRead " . expand("<afile>:r") |
32 \ endif
A (modified) file name is used as an argument to the ``execute'' command
without proper quoting. Crafted file name can be used to execute arbitrary Vim
Shell commands. Content of the file is not important.
3.4.2.1.2. Exploit
domain users that have local administrator privileges on domain assets
to modify their cached accounts to masquerade as other domain users
that have logged in to those domain assets. This will allow local
administrators to temporarily escalate their domain privileges on
domain workstations or servers. If the local administrator masquerades
as an Active Directory Domain Admin account, the modified cached
account is now free to modify system files and user account profiles
using the identity of the Domain Admin's account. This includes
creating scripts to run as the Domain Admin account the next time that
they log in. All files created will not be linked to your domain
account in file and folder access lists. All security access lists
Red Hat, Inc. Tarball software packages are installed and updated via
setup.exe. This program downloads a package list and packages from
mirrors over plaintext HTTP or FTP. The package list contains MD5
checksums for verifying package integrity. If a rogue server answers the
HTTP request responsible for package updates and responds with a
modified MD5 string setup.exe will download and install a malicious package.
ANALYSIS
To successfully exploit this vulnerability an attacker must be able to
somehow position themself such that they can impersonate a Cygwin mirror.
aka an empty bit-string literal, which allows remote attackers to
cause a denial of service (daemon crash) by using this token in a
SQL statement (CVE-2008-3963).
MySQL 5.0.51a allows local users to bypass certain privilege checks by
calling CREATE TABLE on a MyISAM table with modified (1) DATA DIRECTORY
or (2) INDEX DIRECTORY arguments that are associated with symlinks
within pathnames for subdirectories of the MySQL home data directory,
which are followed when tables are created in the future. NOTE: this
vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2008-2079
(CVE-2008-4097).
In the following section, proof of concept code is provided to
demonstrate the problem using the local storage used by Internet
Explorer to store the user's browsing history to deliver HTML with
scripting code and force IE to render it. This analysis is valid for any
Windows NT based operating system but should be slightly modified to run
under Windows Vista. It takes advantage of the following features:
1. The IE user's browsing history is compounded of different files
and folders. One of these files is named 'index.dat', and is usually
located at: 'C:\Documents and settings\USERNAME\Local
/-----------
http://[some_wordpress_blog]/wp-login.php?action=register
- -----------/
This can be modified by the administrator in 'Membership/Anyone can
register'.
/-----------
http://[some_wordpress_blog]/wp-admin/options-general.php
An attacker which is logged into SQL-Ledger (or abuses the missing XSRF protection to execute
requests in the context of a logged-in victim) can modify input variables to perform
SQL injection attacks. One attack is to search for an existing vendor using the »Vendors«
→ »Reports« → »Search« menu. Before submitting the form using the »Delete« button, the
hidden »id« form field is modified to »1 OR 1=1«. This will in turn delete not only one
vendor, but all vendors in the database. As the database table name is also passed in the
form as the hidden »db« form field, data from any database table which has an »id« key can
be deleted using this method.
Similarly to the XSS finding, the main cause of this vulnerability is the inadequate
Paper Description
=================
The paper introduces a new method that enables an attacker to change the .NET language, and to hide malicious code inside its core.
It covers various ways to develop rootkits for the .NET framework, so that every EXE/DLL that runs on a modified Framework will behave differently than what it's supposed to do. Code reviews will not detect backdoors installed inside the Framework since the payload is not in the code itself, but rather it is inside the Framework implementation. Writing Framework rootkits will enable the attacker to install a reverse shell inside the framework, to steal valuable information, to fixate encryption keys, disable security checks and to perform other nasty things as described in this paper.
Paper Summary
============
-= Security Advisory =-
Advisory: Piwik Cookie Unserialize() Vulnerability
Release Date: 2009/12/09
Last Modified: 2009/12/09
Author: Stefan Esser [stefan.esser[at]sektioneins.de]
Application: Piwik <= 0.4.5
Severity: Piwik unserializes() user input which allows an attacker
to send a carefully crafted cookie that when unserialized
Faces standard. JavaServer Faces [10] is a framework that
aids in developing user interfaces for web-based
applications.
When the application's view state is not encrypted, it is
possible for an attacker to supply a new or modified view
object as part of a request. The malicious view can contain
arbitrary HTML code (allowing Cross-Site Scripting), and
arbitrary Expression Language (EL) [11] statements that will
be executed on the server. The EL statements can be used to
read data stored in user-scoped session variables, and
Hi,
A typo in the advisory described above. The last link is not that of
Formshield but another Captcha library. That was not found to be
vulnerable as of now. Please ignore the same. Here is the modified
advisory:
Replay attack on CAPTCHA Libraries
Summary
Faces standard. JavaServer Faces [10] is a framework that
aids in developing user interfaces for web-based
applications.
When the application's view state is not encrypted, it is
possible for an attacker to supply a new or modified view
object as part of a request. The malicious view can contain
arbitrary HTML code (allowing Cross-Site Scripting), and
arbitrary Expression Language (EL) [11] statements that will
be executed on the server. The EL statements can be used to
read data stored in user-scoped session variables, and
Faces standard. JavaServer Faces [10] is a framework that
aids in developing user interfaces for web-based
applications.
When the application's view state is not encrypted, it is
possible for an attacker to supply a new or modified view
object as part of a request. The malicious view can contain
arbitrary HTML code (allowing Cross-Site Scripting), and
arbitrary Expression Language (EL) [11] statements that will
be executed on the server. The EL statements can be used to
read data stored in user-scoped session variables, and
aka an empty bit-string literal, which allows remote attackers to
cause a denial of service (daemon crash) by using this token in a
SQL statement (CVE-2008-3963).
MySQL before 5.0.67 allows local users to bypass certain privilege
checks by calling CREATE TABLE on a MyISAM table with modified (1)
DATA DIRECTORY or (2) INDEX DIRECTORY arguments that are originally
associated with pathnames without symlinks, and that can point to
tables created at a future time at which a pathname is modified
to contain a symlink to a subdirectory of the MySQL home data
directory. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete
Blender [2] is a 3D graphics application released as free software. It
can be used for modeling, texturing, rendering, particle, and other
simulations and creating interactive 3D applications, including games.
Blender embeds a python interpreter to extend its functionality.
Blender .blend project files can be modified to execute arbitrary
commands without user intervention by design. An attacker can take
full control of the machine where Blender is installed by sending a
specially crafted .blend file and enticing the user to open it.
CVE-2009-4030
Sergei Golubchik discovered that MySQL allows local users to bypass certain
privilege checks by calling CREATE TABLE on a MyISAM table with modified
DATA DIRECTORY or INDEX DIRECTORY arguments that are originally associated
with pathnames without symlinks, and that can point to tables created at
a future time at which a pathname is modified to contain a symlink to a
subdirectory of the MySQL data home directory.
servers via a crafted certificate, as demonstrated by a certificate
presented by a server linked against the yaSSL library (CVE-2009-4028).
MySQL 5.1.x before 5.1.41 allows local users to bypass certain
privilege checks by calling CREATE TABLE on a MyISAM table with
modified (1) DATA DIRECTORY or (2) INDEX DIRECTORY arguments
that are originally associated with pathnames without symlinks,
and that can point to tables created at a future time at which a
pathname is modified to contain a symlink to a subdirectory of the
MySQL data home directory, related to incorrect calculation of the
mysql_unpacked_real_data_home value. NOTE: this vulnerability exists
-----------------------------------------------
VSR recommends that Cisco (and any other vendors who provide similar
products) implement more stringent request validation and/or corrections
when receiving requests which do not utilize HTTP-compliant newlines.
While failing to validate requests forwarded to back-end servers is a
reasonable approach when requests are not interpreted or modified, VSR
believes that some responsibility for correctness should be assigned
when HTTP requests are modified in transit.
Three primary approaches are possible for Cisco CSS/ACE devices and
similar load balancers upon receiving invalid newlines (CR which lack a
Faces standard. JavaServer Faces [10] is a framework that
aids in developing user interfaces for web-based
applications.
When the application's view state is not encrypted, it is
possible for an attacker to supply a new or modified view
object as part of a request. The malicious view can contain
arbitrary HTML code (allowing Cross-Site Scripting), and
arbitrary Expression Language (EL) [11] statements that will
be executed on the server. The EL statements can be used to
read data stored in user-scoped session variables, and
The purpose of our advisory was to show that unsecured view states will always be vulnerable to real-world attacks. This changes view state security from a best-practice to a demonstrable vulnerability for all applications developed on the three frameworks described.
Regarding your specific questions:
1) Yes, we did find specific vulnerabilities in all three products listed. The Microsoft vulnerability is demonstrated in the advisory. The Apache MyFaces vulnerability is described in the advisory, but a specific attack is beyond the scope of the advisory. Trustwave has released Deface (https://www.trustwave.com/spiderLabs-tools.php) to demonstrate an actual attack. The Sun Mojarra vulnerability is essentially the same as the one in Apache MyFaces, but is not supported by Deface. If you are familiar with Java, Deface can be modified for use with Mojarra.
2) Enabling encrypted view states in Apache MyFaces and Sun Mojarra will prevent the vulnerability. Microsoft offers several security controls that will effectively prevent the attack. All three frameworks support server-side view states which will also prevent the attacks.
3) Microsoft enables view state MAC (essentially cryptographic signing) by default. Apache MyFaces and Sun Mojarra do not enable encrypted view states by default.
servers via a crafted certificate, as demonstrated by a certificate
presented by a server linked against the yaSSL library (CVE-2009-4028).
MySQL 5.1.x before 5.1.41 allows local users to bypass certain
privilege checks by calling CREATE TABLE on a MyISAM table with
modified (1) DATA DIRECTORY or (2) INDEX DIRECTORY arguments
that are originally associated with pathnames without symlinks,
and that can point to tables created at a future time at which a
pathname is modified to contain a symlink to a subdirectory of the
MySQL data home directory, related to incorrect calculation of the
mysql_unpacked_real_data_home value. NOTE: this vulnerability exists
I'm sorry, but your screenshot actually leads me to not have much more
confidence. I noticed your titlebar is modified, so that tells me the
script is most likely modified in some way. Provide us with a pure
script, please. Also, on an unrelated note, why are you running
professional? Why did you blank out the bottom half of the window?
What are you hiding?
On Wed, 2008-08-20 at 20:56 -0600, beenudel1986@gmail.com wrote:
> ################################################################
> # .___ __ _______ .___ #
Rsyncrypto[1] is a file encryption tool. It has a single RSA key that
encrypts symmetric AES keys per file. The files themselves are subject
to an encryption method that is based on CBC, but does a
security-performance trade off. In particular, the files are encrypted
in such a way that re-encrypting, using the same key, a file that was
slightly modified will result in slightly modified cypher text. This is
needed so that the file will retain wire efficiency when transferred
using rsync[2].
Rsyncrypto does not generate the RSA itself. Instead, the rsyncrypto
manual instructs the user to use openssl in order to generate a private
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# Modified by Fully Modded phpBB © 2002, 2006
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#########################################################################
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# AUTHOR : TurkishWarriorr
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Does this same issue appear in OpenOffice ODF format? Though it does not l=
ook like a huge issue, of itself, it is similar to the way Microsoft ignore=
s metadata in all files, which is a way to add executable code to applicati=
ons with the names of known MS utilities, like notepad.exe. If the metadat=
a file can be modified in the MS word properties dialog, it is also possibl=
e to modify the file in a text editor, and probably get a MS document to ru=
n arbitrary code when you open it. This is the impact that the original po=
st does not make clear.
Wolf Halton
I do think that most people, certainly the users, would feel that this
data belongs to the "document", and would be protected when the
"document" is signed.
Considering that the signature creation time is stored and protected by
the digital signature might help against modified creation times (and
mitigate 2). But applications must consider this, and at least in MS
Word the signature creation time is not displayed next to the other
metadata, but (at least) next to the signature properties.
> This fits the way we use attaching metadata during the process of
I do think that most people, certainly the users, would feel that this
data belongs to the "document", and would be protected when the
"document" is signed.
Considering that the signature creation time is stored and protected by
the digital signature might help against modified creation times (and
mitigate 2). But applications must consider this, and at least in MS
Word the signature creation time is not displayed next to the other
metadata, but (at least) next to the signature properties.
> This fits the way we use attaching metadata during the process of
> I do think that most people, certainly the users, would feel that this
> data belongs to the "document", and would be protected when the
> "document" is signed.
>
> Considering that the signature creation time is stored and protected by
> the digital signature might help against modified creation times (and
> mitigate 2). But applications must consider this, and at least in MS
> Word the signature creation time is not displayed next to the other
> metadata, but (at least) next to the signature properties.
>
>> This fits the way we use attaching metadata during the process of
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