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encrypts
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or special agents on receiving
systems. When an e-mail message is targeted for encryption, the PXE
encryption engine on an IronPort e-mail gateway encrypts the original
e-mail message as an HTML file and attaches it to a notification
e-mail message that is sent to the recipient. The per-message key
used to decrypt the HTML file attachment is stored on a local
IronPort Encryption Appliance, PostX software installation or the
Cisco Registered Envelope Service, which is a Cisco-managed software
service.
PXE Encryption Privacy Vulnerabilities
1) Find the XOR keystream by XORing an arbitrary string s
with its encrypted form:
keystream = unbase64(lsencrypt(s)) XOR s
2) Now you can decrypt any encrypted password:
password = unbase64(encrypted_password) XOR keystream
This result strongly suggested that AES-256 has no role in
the encryption scheme. Digging a little deeper, Compass
Vendor Contact Date: 4/20/2010
Status: Vendor does not want to fix the vulnerability.
Vulnerability Details:
RSA Key Manager Client software uses an SQLite database to cache its encryption keys. The software fails to properly validate the metadata embedded inside of the RSA Key Manager encrypted data when it perform a key lookup when the encrypted data is being decrypted.An attacker can inject SQL commands into the metadata section of the RSA Key Manager encrypted data, which will be executed by the Key Manager Client software. For example, an attacker can inject SQL statements to modify existing encryption keys, remove existing encryption keys, add new encryption keys, etc.
The Key Manager client uses two types of cache: memory cache and file cache. As long as both or either of the caches are enabled the problem can be triggered easily.
RSA Key Manager Client 1.5.x uses the following format when it encrypts data:
Field 1 = KeyIdStringField 2 = NULL TerminatorField 3 = Encryption IVField 4 = Encrypted Data
Encryptionn Key Cache tables:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco IronPort
Encryption Appliance
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20100210-ironport
Revision 1.0
+Impact
Potentially High
+Description
When logging into a Prolog database all of the usernames and passwords
are sent to the workstation. Depending on the encryption level of the
database cracking the passwords is trivial to annoying.
If you attempt a login with ANY username/password combination the
entire dataset of usernames and passwords is passed to the workstation
to parse and authenticate. Any network sniffer can catch the dataset
Vendor: QNAP Systems
Products (verified): TS-239 Pro, TS-639 Pro
Products (unverified): SS-439 Pro, TS-439 Pro, TS-439U-SP/RP,
TS-509 Pro, SS-839 Pro, TS-809 Pro, TS-809U-RP
Vulnerability: hard disk encryption bypass due recovery key
Affected Releases: 3.1.1 0815, 3.1.0 0627, 2.1.7 0613,
and presumably all other
Severity: Moderate/High
CVE: CVE-2009-3200
using modulus n, exponent e, deterministic checksum function
(modular sum of all bytes) and plain RSA in ECB mode with null
padding.
5) Client sends ciphertext to server, which does the reverse of 4
to decrypt the message using the per-session private key d.
PEAR Crypt_RSA2 provides RSA encryption/decryption compatible
with jCryption, thus essentially just step 4.
PEAR Crypt_RSA uses a plain RSA operation in the following way:
======
CVE-2010-1324
An unauthenticated remote attacker can forge GSS tokens that are
intended to be integrity-protected but unencrypted, if the targeted
pre-existing application session uses a DES session key.
An authenticated remote attacker can forge PACs if using a KDC that
does not filter client-provided PAC data. This can result in
privilege escalation against a service that relies on PAC contents to
as S/N, default SSID, and default WEP/WPA key. Chances are that if you
own a wireless router which uses a default WEP or WPA key, such key
can be predicted based on publicly-available information such as the
router's MAC address or SSID. In other words: it's quite likely that
the bad guys can break into your network if you're using the default
encryption key. Thanks to Kevin, our suspicion that such issue exists
on the BT Home Hub has been confirmed (keep reading for more
details!). Our advice is: *use WPA rather than WEP and change the
default encryption key now!*
as S/N, default SSID, and default WEP/WPA key. Chances are that if you
own a wireless router which uses a default WEP or WPA key, such key
can be predicted based on publicly-available information such as the
router's MAC address or SSID. In other words: it's quite likely that
the bad guys can break into your network if you're using the default
encryption key. Thanks to Kevin, our suspicion that such issue exists
on the BT Home Hub has been confirmed (keep reading for more
details!). Our advice is: *use WPA rather than WEP and change the
default encryption key now!*
as S/N, default SSID, and default WEP/WPA key. Chances are that if you
own a wireless router which uses a default WEP or WPA key, such key
can be predicted based on publicly-available information such as the
router's MAC address or SSID. In other words: it's quite likely that
the bad guys can break into your network if you're using the default
encryption key. Thanks to Kevin, our suspicion that such issue exists
on the BT Home Hub has been confirmed (keep reading for more
details!). Our advice is: *use WPA rather than WEP and change the
default encryption key now!*
as S/N, default SSID, and default WEP/WPA key. Chances are that if you
own a wireless router which uses a default WEP or WPA key, such key
can be predicted based on publicly-available information such as the
router's MAC address or SSID. In other words: it's quite likely that
the bad guys can break into your network if you're using the default
encryption key. Thanks to Kevin, our suspicion that such issue exists
on the BT Home Hub has been confirmed (keep reading for more
details!). Our advice is: *use WPA rather than WEP and change the
default encryption key now!*
===============================ADVISORY===============================
Advisory: Data Encryption Systems - DESLock+ - Local Kernel
Code Execution/Denial of Service
Advisory ID: DSEC-2011-0002
Author: Neil Kettle, Digit Security Ltd
Affected Software: Data Encryption Systems - DESLock+
Vendor URL: http://www.deslock.com
Vendor Status: unpatched
Category: Denial of Service/Privilege Escalation
Date Reported: 2008/07/31
> RKM Appliance, all versions
> Customer using EMC PowerPath with RSA encryption
> Customer using Brocade Encryption Switches with RSA encryption
>
> What is the impact?
> An attacker can attempt to modify the cache to insert an arbitrary encryption key that may lead to data unavailability (such as decryption failure of data encrypted by that modified key).
>
> There is no impact on confidentiality of the data as the attacker would need the cache encryption key in order to decrypt the data.
>
> As of the date of this posting, RSA is not aware of any instances where this vulnerability may have been compromised nor are there signs of published exploit code.
>
Corporation [1].
The authentication process of ServiceDesk Plus obfuscates user passwords
using a trivial and symmetrical algorithm in Javascript code with no
secret. Given that user passwords are locally stored in user cookies and
having the Javascript code to encrypt and decrypt passwords in a .js
file , the authentication process of ServiceDesk Plus can be bypassed
allowing an attacker to get usernames+passwords of registered users.
Additionally, a cross site scripting vulnerability related to search
functions was found.
RKM Appliance, all versions
Customer using EMC PowerPath with RSA encryption
Customer using Brocade Encryption Switches with RSA encryption
What is the impact?
An attacker can attempt to modify the cache to insert an arbitrary encryption key that may lead to data unavailability (such as decryption failure of data encrypted by that modified key).
There is no impact on confidentiality of the data as the attacker would need the cache encryption key in order to decrypt the data.
As of the date of this posting, RSA is not aware of any instances where this vulnerability may have been compromised nor are there signs of published exploit code.
kvm switch without asking the user for username/password again.
CVE-2009-1477: Same SSL Key for all devices
All tested devices (KH1516i, KN9116 and PN9108) use the same SSL key
for the https web interface. If an attacker manages to extract the
private key from one single device, (s)he can decrypt the https
traffic of all other affected devices. This includes the username and
password used to authenticate to the kvm switch. If the attacker is
able to carry out a man in the middle attack, (s)he can also
compromise client systems by exchanging the windows or java client
software which is downloaded from the kvm switch via https.
Description:
CVE Identifier: CVE-2010-1904
The vulnerability was that cache could be modified to insert an arbitrary encryption key that may lead to data unavailability (such as decryption failure of data encrypted by that modified key). There was no impact on confidentiality of the data as the attacker would need the cache encryption key in order to decrypt the data.
The fix addresses this vulnerability for the below platforms.
•Microsoft Windows XP SP2 or higher
•Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 SP1
To: L-rsyncrypto <rsyncrypto-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
Background
Rsyncrypto[1] is a file encryption tool. It has a single RSA key that
encrypts symmetric AES keys per file. The files themselves are subject
to an encryption method that is based on CBC, but does a
security-performance trade off. In particular, the files are encrypted
in such a way that re-encrypting, using the same key, a file that was
slightly modified will result in slightly modified cypher text. This is
Aditya K Sood wrote:
> The pidgin client inherits client side password disclosure
> vulnerability. The credentials used to
> connect to the required service i.e. username and password is not
> encrypted properly. The credentials
what do you propose? encrypt the password and store the encryption key
in memory? encrypt the password and the encryption key and store the
encryption key of the encryption key in memory?
...
$cookie = $_COOKIE[$USER_COOKIE];
if (isset($COOKIE_KEY)) {
$iv = mcrypt_create_iv(mcrypt_get_iv_size (MCRYPT_BLOWFISH, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB), MCRYPT_RAND);
$cookie = mcrypt_decrypt(MCRYPT_BLOWFISH, $COOKIE_KEY, base64_decode($cookie), MCRYPT_MODE_ECB, $iv);
}
$cookie = rtrim($cookie);
$a = split('&', $cookie);
$i = 0;
while ($i < count($a)) {
fix the CAPTCHA value to a specific value and send that value to the
server as part of every request and gain access to protected
resources.
The Formshield CAPTCHA uses a dynamic key stored in the __VIEWSTATE of
the request and sends encrypted text to the server for obtaining and
displaying new image text in the CAPTCHA on the page every time. There
are 2 problems with this approach:
The encrypted text for a specific image always remains the same
Aditya K Sood wrote:
> The pidgin client inherits client side password disclosure
> vulnerability. The credentials used to
> connect to the required service i.e. username and password is not
> encrypted properly. The credentials
what do you propose? encrypt the password and store the encryption key
in memory? encrypt the password and the encryption key and store the
encryption key of the encryption key in memory?
fix the CAPTCHA value to a specific value and send that value to the
server as part of every request and gain access to protected
resources.
The Formshield CAPTCHA uses a dynamic key stored in the __VIEWSTATE of
the request and sends encrypted text to the server for obtaining and
displaying new image text in the CAPTCHA on the page every time. There
are 2 problems with this approach:
The encrypted text for a specific image always remains the same
Public disclosure: 03/2008
PART I - COMPROMISING USER’S ACCOUNT
Explanation:
When user already has session and he/she clicks on that link (from email), the exploit code will be automatically executed. User’s email address is changed without his/her notice. At the same time, his/her current email address, first and last name, and current encrypted password (in User Information page) is logged by a remote server side script.
The attacker reads all these information in a log file.
After that, he gets a new user password sent to his email address by using Lost Password form.
With victim’s username and password, the attacker has full permission on that account and does whatever he wants.
Upon finishing his works, he changes back user’s initial email address and encrypted password.
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Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Software Crafted Encryption Packet
Denial of Service Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20090923-tls
Revision 1.0
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.....
Apple's Mail.app stores your S/MIME encrypted emails in clear text
Date published: 2008-10-03
Affected version: 3.5 (929.4/929.2)
1. By default, IMail allows Internet Guest Account to have "Full Control" to the following registry key,
including its subkeys and values. As well as the default IMail directory:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Ipswitch\IMail
C:\Program Files\Ipswitch\IMail\
2. The IMail password decryption algorithm implemented in IMailsec.dll is also reversible.
0x03 : Vendor Communication
1/21/2010 - IMail vendor contacted
1/26/2010 - Got a reply from the vendor (product development manager) for more vulnerability clarification.
a) the accounts.xml file's location can be overriden (so that I can re-direct to a network shared TrueCrypt drive over an IPSEC protected pipe in a VLAN'd network :p)
b) to be able to disable the "Save Password" option and ensure it cannot be overridden by the user by default
In an institution where the authentication piece is tied into the universal PIM LDAP, as-is, the usage of your application puts us in awkward position, as it has been deemed against the policies to "store" such authentication information in the open in an easily accessible location.
Per your post on http://developer.pidgin.im/wiki/PlainTextPasswords here, AFAIK there still isn't any plugin that decrypts/encrypts the saved password file either :/
Such position your team is taking, pretty much ties our hands and cripples us on spreading the good word about Pidgin: IMO one of the best chat applications out there!
Anyways, please keep up the good work and I look forward to the development of Pidgin!
TLS Proxy for Encrypted Voice Inspection
+---------------------------------------
The TLS proxy for encrypted voice inspection feature allows the
security appliance to decrypt, inspect and modify (as needed, for
example, performing NAT fixup), and re-encrypt voice signaling
traffic while all of the existing VoIP inspection functions for SCCP
and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) protocols are preserved. Once
voice signaling is decrypted, the plain-text signaling message is
passed to the existing inspection engines. The security appliance
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