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0065A336 |. E8 284BF5FF |CALL xnview.005AEE63 ;
\xnview.005AEE63
0065A33B |. 83C4 10 |ADD ESP,10
0065A33E |. 83F8 01 |CMP EAX,1
0065A341 |. 0F85 81000000 |JNZ xnview.0065A3C8
0065A347 |. 8A4424 1C |MOV AL,BYTE PTR SS:[ESP+1C]
0065A34B |. 84C0 |TEST AL,AL
0065A34D |. 66:0FBEC0 |MOVSX AX,AL
0065A351 |. 7D 22 |JGE SHORT xnview.0065A375
0065A353 |. 8B13 |MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX]
0065A355 |. F7D8 |NEG EAX
Size
Size on disk
webengine.exe
10/30/2009 12:11:16 PM
2936832 bytes
2936832 bytes
freeaccess.spl
10/23/2009 11:24:08 AM
1010489 bytes
};
+/* This is at least as big as the largest size of an integer that
+ encode_int can generate; it is sufficient for creating buffers for
+ it to write into. This assumes that integers are at most 64 bits,
+ and so 10 bytes (with 7 bits of information each) are sufficient to
+ represent them. */
+#define MAX_ENCODED_INT_LEN 10
+/* This is at least as big as the largest size for a single instruction. */
+#define MAX_INSTRUCTION_LEN (2*MAX_ENCODED_INT_LEN+1)
+/* This is at least as big as the largest possible instructions
The ZIP file format:
Local file header:
Offset Length Contents
0 4 bytes Local file header signature (0x04034b50)
4 2 bytes Version needed to extract
6 2 bytes General purpose bit flag
8 2 bytes Compression method
10 2 bytes Last mod file time
12 2 bytes Last mod file date
...
} else if (type == T_PTR) {
switch ( af ) {
case AF_INET:
sprintf(tempstring,"%u.%u.%u.%u.in-addr.arpa",
((byte *)&rp->ip)[3],
((byte *)&rp->ip)[2],
((byte *)&rp->ip)[1],
((byte *)&rp->ip)[0]);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
----------------------------
Vulnerability Descriptions
----------------------------
1. Specially crafted infected POSIX TAR files with "[aliases]" as first 9 bytes
evades detection.
Affected products -
ClamAV 0.96.4, CAT-QuickHeal 11.00
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
I expanded on Jon Butler's exploit and was able to inject a Meterpreter
payload into the remote process despite the buffer's small size (268
bytes). This was done by overwriting the ret value with part of the
Meterpreter payload.
- - Explanation of Process:
http://paulmakowski.wordpress.com/2010/02/28/increasing-payload-size-w-return-address-overwrite/
- - Vulnerable Program:
heap. This vulnerability can be exploited to overwrite adjacent heap
chunks metadata, and possibly to gain arbitrary code execution (though
it does not seem easy).
When processing certain structures from a FPX file, Corel Paint Shop Pro
Photo X2 allocates fixed-size (0xC08 bytes) buffers, and copies data
from the FPX file to that buffer. But the application trusts certain
bytes from the FPX file and uses them as loop counters for the copy
operation, without properly verifying that these bytes have legal
values. If those user-controlled bytes used as counters have large
values, the buffer overflow will be triggered.
extraordinarily unlikely conditions. Other scenarios are more likely
to lead to denial of service.
This advisory makes some reasonable assumptions about the platform.
We assume that attempts to invoke malloc() to allocate nearly SIZE_MAX
bytes will fail, which is reasonable for conventional memory
architectures. We also assume that the process has less than UINT_MAX
contiguous bytes of heap address space mapped, which is reasonable
given likely hardware and operating system configurations.
The Kerberos protocol specifications define the format of valid
----------------------------------------------------------------
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info
1 0.000000 fec0:0:beef:f00d::feed fe80::754f:6144:be9e:2ae7 DHCPv6 Reply
Frame 1 (183 bytes on wire, 183 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: 50:48:49:4f:4e:53 (50:48:49:4f:4e:53), Dst: 50:48:49:4f:4e:43 (50:48:49:4f:4e:43)
Internet Protocol Version 6
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 547 (547), Dst Port: 546 (546)
DHCPv6
Message type: Reply (7)
operations to be performed for signing or for the verification of
signatures, but instead limits itself to providing a framework that any
signature mechanism can be plugged into.
The specification defines how the document is to be serialized into the
sequence of bytes that is fed into the signature mechanism, it defines the
way the resulting signature blob along with possible mechanism-specific
signature meta data is to be stored within the file, and it specifies
a marker that is used to distinguish between signature mechanisms.
Practically, PKCS#7 seems to be the prevalent signature mechanism in use,
XR device will restart the peering session by sending a notification.
The peering session will flap until the sender stops sending the
invalid/corrupt update.
This is a different vulnerability to what was disclosed in the Cisco
Security Advisory "Cisco IOS Software Border Gateway Protocol 4-Byte
Autonomous System Number Vulnerabilities" disclosed on the 2009 July
29 1600 UTC at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090729-bgp.shtml
ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 1.49(20080319:195807) [CRS-1 ROMMON],
CRS uptime is 4 weeks, 4 days, 1 minute
System image file is "disk0:hfr-os-mbi-3.6.2/mbihfr-rp.vm"
cisco CRS-8/S (7457) processor with 4194304K bytes of memory.
7457 processor at 1197Mhz, Revision 1.2
17 Packet over SONET/SDH network interface(s)
1 DWDM controller(s)
17 SONET/SDH Port controller(s)
ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 1.49(20080319:195807) [CRS-1 ROMMON],
CRS uptime is 4 weeks, 4 days, 1 minute
System image file is "disk0:hfr-os-mbi-3.6.2/mbihfr-rp.vm"
cisco CRS-8/S (7457) processor with 4194304K bytes of memory.
7457 processor at 1197Mhz, Revision 1.2
17 Packet over SONET/SDH network interface(s)
1 DWDM controller(s)
17 SONET/SDH Port controller(s)
be exploited by remote attackers to trigger a memory corruption
vulnerability by enticing an unsuspecting user to open a specially
crafted 3DS file, possibly leading to arbitrary code execution.
When processing certain structures from a 3DS file, Google SketchUp
trusts bytes from the 3DS file without performing validations and uses
them as:
1. an operand in pointer arithmetics to calculate an index for an
array where user-controlled data will be written.
2. a loop counter in a copy operation.
To fill the buffer, it does not need to be static data, so ENG uses random
data to fill the entire buffer, using a very, very simple technique that any
student is able to apply while learning C programming language:
1. Check the length of buffer to overflow: in this case it is 96
bytes;
2. Make a choice: lower case or mixed case;
3. Use randomized data to fill it up: lower case (0x41 to 0x5a) and
(0x41 to 0x5a for odds and 0x61 to 0x7a for evens)
-[ Return Address [7]
Sometimes, the administrators relay in cygwin security in order to
open a daemon to the net (sshd, telnetd, ftpd ...) over cygwin.
III. DESCRIPTION
-------------------------
Traditionally, linux filesystem allow 255 bytes long, nevertheless
cygwin allow 239 bytes and there is a check that prevents filenames
equal or major than 240.
In spite of the check, there is a 232 bytes long dynamic memory buffer
where is stored the filename, so that is possible make a evil filename
Entering a valid username (default value is »esadmin«) and a very long string into
the password field a buffer overflow is triggered.
The function Java_com_ibm_es_oss_CryptionNative_ESEncrypt() defined in the file
/opt/IBM/es/lib/libffq.cryptionjni.so is copying the password value to a fixed size
buffer of 2048 bytes.
There are two attack points to exploit this buffer overflow.
The first attack is based on the following buffer combination
ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 1.05(20101118:025914) [ASR9K ROMMON],
Router uptime is 9 weeks, 1 day, 5 hours, 53 minutes
System image file is "bootflash:disk0/asr9k-os-mbi-4.1.0/mbiasr9k-rp.vm"
cisco ASR9K Series (MPC8641D) processor with 4194304K bytes of memory.
MPC8641D processor at 1333MHz, Revision 2.2
ASR-9010-CHASSIS
4 Management Ethernet
8 WANPHY controller(s)
4.Vendor Information, solutions and workarounds
5.Credits
6.Technical description
6.1.NTLMv1 authentication protocol
6.2.The Flaws
6.3.Detecting if the SMB service generates duplicate 8-byte challenges
6.4.Exploiting duplicate challenges
6.4.1.Proof-of-Concept Exploit
6.5.Predicting challenges
6.5.1.SMB service: challenge generation process
6.5.2.Proof-of-Concept Exploit
Convert the "XXX" values to hexadecimal: CP0615313039
Process with SHA-1: 742da831d2b657fa53d347301ec610e1ebf8a3d0
The last 3 bytes are converted to 6 byte string, and appended to
the word "SpeedTouch" which becomes the default SSID: SpeedTouchF8A3D0
The first 5 bytes are converted to a 10 byte string which becomes
the default WEP/WPA key: 742DA831D2
are used-controlled.
vulnerable code, theese routines u3d.8bi (this is repeated one time for
each byte of the string), run trace:
..
10A05C30 55 push ebp
10A05C31 8BEC mov ebp, esp
10A05C33 83EC 10 sub esp, 10
Vulnerability
-------------
Encryption is used at various points by the components that make up
the NNT Change Tracker Enterprise suite, but the same hard-coded
encryption key is always used. The key is a byte array with values at
the following indices:
[0] = 21;
[1] = 23;
[2] = 2;
Convert the "XXX" values to hexadecimal: CP0615313039
Process with SHA-1: 742da831d2b657fa53d347301ec610e1ebf8a3d0
The last 3 bytes are converted to 6 byte string, and appended to
the word "SpeedTouch" which becomes the default SSID: SpeedTouchF8A3D0
The first 5 bytes are converted to a 10 byte string which becomes
the default WEP/WPA key: 742DA831D2
Convert the "XXX" values to hexadecimal: CP0615313039
Process with SHA-1: 742da831d2b657fa53d347301ec610e1ebf8a3d0
The last 3 bytes are converted to 6 byte string, and appended to
the word "SpeedTouch" which becomes the default SSID: SpeedTouchF8A3D0
The first 5 bytes are converted to a 10 byte string which becomes
the default WEP/WPA key: 742DA831D2
Felipe,
The bug goes back all the way to 2.4.0. But please keep in mind that
this exploit was intended as a joke - it only allows you to read a
single byte of uninitialized kernel stack memory, out of a 64-byte
buffer. In addition, you're not even guaranteed to be reading
contiguous data if you request sequential bytes. Even considering the
fact that on x86, the memory will be read from the soft IRQ stack
instead of the current process kernel stack, I seriously doubt that
you could get anything useful out of a single byte that probably just
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
The problem with this code is that the second call to mempcy()
uses strlen() to check if there is enough buffer space but
uses the variable value_len to determine the amount of bytes
to copy. The problem is that there could be a NUL byte inside
the value of the cookie, which will result in a stack based
buffer overflow. While the same code can also be found inside
the suhosin_decrypt_single_cookie() function the problem cannot
be exploited, because in that case there cannot be a NUL byte.
This software is massively used in the World Wide Web, and has been
audited by the security community for years.
III. DESCRIPTION
-------------------------
It is possible to get the first 1000 bytes from an arbitrary file
trough the tiki-listmovies.php script.
This script sets the movie parameter value into $movie. The last 4
bytes are erased and an .xml extension is appended. Then, the file is
opened for reading with the call fopen($confFile,'r') and the first
The problem is enough unusual and affects the code that handles a
certain type of packets on the UDP port.
In short the server does the following:
- it uses memcpy to copy the data from the packet into a stack buffer
of exactly 0x2b8 bytes (handled as 0x2b9 bytes)
- later this data is handled as a string but no final NULL byte
delimiter is inserted
- there is also an off-by-one bug since one byte overwrites the lower
8bit value of a saved element (a stack pointer 017bff??)
- after this buffer are located some pushed elements and obviously the
Convert the "XXX" values to hexadecimal: CP0615313039
Process with SHA-1: 742da831d2b657fa53d347301ec610e1ebf8a3d0
The last 3 bytes are converted to 6 byte string, and appended to
the word "SpeedTouch" which becomes the default SSID: SpeedTouchF8A3D0
The first 5 bytes are converted to a 10 byte string which becomes
the default WEP/WPA key: 742DA831D2
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