that took ~(N + M) milliseconds to be processed.
There is a security advisory published in 2003 by Marco Ivaldi detailing exactly this kind of flaw
against SSH [1].
More recently, also about SSH, Dawn Xiaodong Song, David Wagner and Xuqing Tian wrote an interesting
paper detailing an attack based on keystrokes intervals analysis [2].
Now about benchmarking attacks:
-------------------------------
socket implementation. Local users can exploit this vulnerability
to cause a denial of service (system hang).
CVE-2009-3638
David Wagner reported an overflow in the KVM subsystem on i386
systems. This issue is exploitable by local users with access to
the /dev/kvm device file.
For the stable distribution (lenny), this problem has been fixed in
version 2.6.26-19lenny2.
Around 10 years ago the PRNG used was id++.
I still think that the algorithm we invented as a group with Niels
Provos, David Mazieres, some researchers at Core SDI, and further
improved by David Wagner is better than what ISC is shipping. We've
been using our algorithm for 10+ years, too. Not just for DNS ID's
but also for the related problem of IP ID's. Every packet our
machines generate hits the same algorithm, to help a bit with the IP
ID ++ issues.
